Brief Outline Of An Account Of Knowledge, Justification, And Reasons

 

In a minimal sense, believing that P for some reason R can be understood in terms of a rational transition from one conceptual state to another. A rational transition is one that a subject can self-consciously represent in terms of their reasons for believing that P. When one conceptual state rationally guides the formation of another, the content of the former state provides the reason for the formation of the latter. In this minimal sense, reasons for belief are non-factive. Even if conceptual state does not accurately or truly represent reality, its content can still serve as a reason for beliefs. 

Justified beliefs are beliefs formed for good reasons that are provided by the contents of justifying conceptual states. Even if one believes that Socrates is mortal because all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, unless one justifiably believes that all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, the resulting judgment will not be justified. Furthermore, if one forms a belief for bad reasons, it will not be justified even if one justifiably believes those reasons. 

Good reasons for belief are reasons that, if they are factive, ensure the truth of the resulting judgment. Justifying conceptual states are states that are or yield knowledge when things go well. When one believes P for good reasons that one knows to be true, one’s belief is explained by the facts that one knows. These facts ensure that the resulting belief is also knowledge. 

In summary: 

Reasons for belief can be understood in terms of rational transitions between conceptual states. One’s reasons are provided by the contents of the conceptual states that lead to one’s judgment.

Justification is the result of appropriate transitions between conceptual states. These transitions are appropriate because, in good conditions, they yield knowledge. 

Rational judgment is a capacity to know what is the case on the basis of facts that establish the truth of one’s beliefs. 

-The Account Applied To Perceptual Knowledge

In order to form justified perceptual beliefs, one’s perceptual judgments must be the result of rational transitions from justifying conceptual states. Since our perceptual judgments are guided by our perceptual experiences, perceptual experiences must therefore be conceptual states. 

If a perceptual experience represents some fact P, that experience, in the absence of defeaters, enables one to justifiably believe what it represents. In normal cases, if the experience is veridical, it enables one to know that P on the basis of the fact that P. Because the evidence provided by veridical perception, in normal cases, guarantees the truth of one’s perceptual judgments, these judgments are incompatible with the possibility of error.

Physicalist Q&A

 Q: Why can we conceive of the mind being separate from the body? 

A: Co-referring concepts are not always applied on the basis of the same evidence. For instance, even though water is composed of H20, the evidence that leads us to apply our ‘water’ concept (the presence of watery stuff) is not the evidence that leads us to apply our ‘H20’ concept. That is why further scientific investigation is required in order for us to conclude that what fills our lakes and rivers is, in fact, H20. 

When co-referring concepts are not applied on the basis of the same evidence, it can seem conceivable for the referent of one concept to be present in the absence of the other. This is why some people have thought that they could conceive of a world where water was not actually composed of H20. However, in most cases, this apparent possibility can be understood as a world where the evidence that leads us to apply one concept is present in the absence of the other concept’s referent. Thus, when it seems conceivable that water could be present without H20, what we are actually conceiving of is a world where watery stuff is present in the absence of H20. 

Once we understand that watery stuff is only contingently associated with water, we can recognize that the world we are conceiving of is not a world where water is present in the absence of H20 after all. Instead, it is a world where the watery stuff that fills lakes and rivers is a different kind of liquid altogether. 

However, in the case of the mind and body, it does not seem possible to explain their apparent distinctness in this way. This is because, unlike the evidence that leads us to apply our ‘water’ concept, our evidence for consciousness (our direct acquaintance with phenomenal properties) is not contingently associated with the actual presence of consciousness. Rather, when our evidence for phenomenal consciousness is present, this evidence entails that consciousness is present as well. Consequently, if it is possible for our evidence for consciousness to be present in the absence of the body, it is possible for consciousness to be present in the absence of the body too. In this sense, the appearance of mind-body distinctness is robust in a way that the appearance of water-H20 distinctness is not. 

The apparent conceivability of the mind being separate from the body raises two questions that physicalists must answer: First, why do the mind and body appear to be distinct? Second, why is this appearance of distinctness robust? The answer to the first question is that the mind and body appear distinct because we do not apply our mental and physical concepts on the basis of the same evidence. The answer to the second is that this appearance is robust because the evidence that leads us to apply our mental concepts is necessarily associated with the actual presence of consciousness. 

These answers provide the physicalist with grounds for denying the link between the robust conceivability of mind-body distinctness and metaphysical possibility: Co-referring concepts are not always applied on the basis of the same evidence and it is possible for one co-referring concept, but not the other, to be applied on the basis of evidence that is necessarily associated with its referent. Since these conditions can give rise to a robust, but misleading appearance of distinctness, there is no link between robust appearances of distinctness and metaphysical possibility. Although conceivability can provide defeasible support for an inference to possibility, this support can be overcome by a posteriori evidence for metaphysical necessities. The physicalist can appeal to our scientific discoveries about the brain as sufficient evidence of this sort. 

Q: If it is possible to robustly conceive of metaphysical impossibilities, how can conceivability be evidence for possibility?

A: The evidential status of conceivability can be understood in simple, bayesian terms. Robust conceivability requires two distinct concepts that are not applied on the basis of the same qualitative evidence. If I am thinking of two distinct things, I must have two distinct concepts that, in almost all cases, will not be applied on the basis of the same evidence. By contrast, thinking of one thing is possible without having two distinct concepts. Consequently, the fact that I can robustly conceive of one thing in the absence of the other is more readily predicted by the hypothesis that I really am conceiving of two distinct things. So even though we can robustly conceive of metaphysical impossibilities, that does not stop conceivability from providing defeasible evidence of possibility. 

Q: If consciousness is physical, why does there seem to be an explanatory gap regarding the emergence of consciousness in nature? 

A: Normally, we can explain some natural phenomenon by discovering what sort of thing it is and describing how that sort of thing is realized by more basic physical facts. This is possible because the sorts of things that science usually explains can be essentially characterized in causal-structural terms. For instance, we can give a scientific account of water by first discovering that it is a kind of liquid that has certain characteristic causes and effects. We can then describe the lower level physical phenomena that come together to realize those characteristics. This allows us to understand what empirical facts are responsible for the presence of water and why they are sufficient. 

But in the case of consciousness, we cannot arrive at any substantial characterization of what sort of thing it is by appealing to causal-structural characteristics. Such a characterization is not a conceptual truth associated with our concept of consciousness. Furthermore, we cannot directly arrive at one through empirical investigation because we apply our mental concepts on the basis of our direct acquaintance with phenomenal consciousness itself. Since our direct acquaintance with experiences does not lead us to any conclusions about it’s potential causal-structural characteristics, we can only arrive them via an a posteriori identification of consciousness with some physical phenomenon. 

However, if such an identification is made, then once we have provided an explanation of the identified physical phenomenon, no further explanation of consciousness is required. This simply follows from the fact that, when two things are identical, an explanation of one is an explanation of the other. What makes the case of consciousness unique is that an a posteriori identification is required in order for an explanation to proceed. 

Q: Suppose Mary lives in a black and white room where she learns every physical fact relevant to the experience of color. Upon leaving the room and seeing the color red for the first time, it seems like she will come to learn something new. But if facts about consciousness are physical facts, how could this be possible? 

A: When Mary leaves her room and sees the color red , she is directly acquainted with the color red for the first time. On this basis, she learns that “*this* is what it is like to see red”. This is a new belief about a fact that she already knew in her room via a different thought. Her new belief involves the use of a new demonstrative concept that is applied on the basis of her direct acquaintance with the property that it refers to. She could not have formed this belief in her room because it involves a demonstrative that is specifically used to refer to the color red on the basis of her direct acquaintance. If she had used a demonstrative concept to refer to the color red while she was inside of her room, the concept would have had a distinct kind of originating use. Since concepts are individuated by their originating uses, her new knowledge could only be acquired by actually having an experience of red. 

Reflections On The Story Of Babel

In Genesis 11, we are told that the peoples of the earth once possessed a common language and used the same words to speak of things. Migrating westward, this unified human community arrives at a plain where they decide to build a city containing a tower that could reach the heavens. Upon witnessing their pursuit of this project, it is said that God decided to confuse their speech and dissolve their shared linguistic bond. He then scattered the people across the earth, leaving the unfinished remains of a city henceforth known as “Babel”. 

It is sometimes suggested that the story of the tower of Babel serves as an etiology that provides a mythic explanation for the origin of linguistic diversity across human communities. According to such an account, it may seem as though God’s decision to confuse the languages of humanity was simply a response to the construction of Babel. Had the people never decided to build their tower to the heavens, one might suppose that they would have never lost the unified language that they all shared.  

However, this supposition fails to adequately account for the intimate connection between humanity’s common language and their project at Babel described in Genesis 11. According to the story, the construction of Babel is not simply enabled by a common human language. Rather, it plays an essential role in the ongoing preservation of that language. Only by building the city and its tower, the people claim, can they avoid being “scattered abroad across the face of the whole earth”. In other words, their shared language and the construction of Babel are both necessary, mutually dependent elements of humanity’s attempt to seize control of their own fate. 

In what sense can the shared human project at Babel be said to prevent their being scattered across the world? How can it be a necessary condition for their common language? The unity of a common language is shaped by the form of life that its speakers share with one another. In the absence of a shared project that characterizes their form of life, the lives of the various peoples at Babel, along with the languages that suit their ways of living, will have nothing to hold them together as one. As their forms of life diverge in accordance with their different projects, so will the languages that reflect those forms. Rather than being a project made possible by their common language, the peoples of Genesis 11 share a language only insofar as they also share the common goal of constructing the city and its tower. Their lives as builders of the city is where their language finds its proper home. 

If a shared form of life is essential to the possibility and preservation of a universal human language, what is the form of life that the peoples of Genesis 11 actually share? Why does it lead God to intervene in their affairs? Unlike the subsequent circumstances that unite the various people groups that God scatters across the earth, the lives of the people at Babel are engaged in a unique project of spiritual resistance. Specifically, they are not united by their place within a world  provided by God. Rather, they aim to create a world that ignores their dependence on the divine. With the creation of Babel’s great tower, they intend to overcome the separation between earth and Heaven that characterizes the distinction between humanity and God and subject the world to their own wills. By placing themselves above all of creation and forgetting their dependence on God, the people at Babel have become idolatrous. It is this idolatry that leads God to act against their ambitions and confuse their speech.

God’s defeat of the idolatry at Babel is not motivated by a superficial desire to reserve power for himself alone. Depicting God as a sort of Zeus for the Ancient Near East fails to reveal the true essence of idolatry and its importance for humanity. When faced with the idolatry at Babel, we must first ask why it is contrary to God’s will for His creation. Idolatry is not a danger because humanity is mistaken about what they can accomplish. As God Himself acknowledges in the story, the people at Babel really are on their way to being able to overcome any obstacle they encounter. (11:6) But by subjecting God’s creation to their own ends, the people at Babel are no longer allowing God’s creation to flourish in accordance with its own essence. Instead of shouldering their responsibility as shepherds of the things that God created, they have chosen to do violence to the world as it was originally intended to be. Crucially, this is not simply limited to the created world around them. By subjecting the world to their own purposes, humans no longer live in accordance with their own essential role as shepherds. Human nature itself, along with rest of the world, is distorted by the violence of idolatry. 

In the time before the construction of Babel, the wickedness of humanity had led God to blot out every living thing from the face of the earth. In the aftermath, God made a covenant with Noah to never again flood the earth and destroy the life He had created. With humanity’s renewed defiance at Babel, Genesis presents God’s adherence to his covenant and a new approach to the corruption of nature. Instead of punishing humanity for their idolatry by destroying them, God decides to save them in spite of their wickedness. Confusing the language of the people at Babel serves as the first step of God’s new solution to human evil. This solution continues with the story of Abraham, where God promises that He will make Abraham’s name great. This commitment stands in stark contrast the people at Babel who attempt to make their own name great (11:4), without faith in God. 

Taken together, the stories of Babel and Abraham present the nature of human wickedness and God’s solution to it: Human wickedness consists in the idolatrous desire to make one’s own name great. Human redemption lies in a life of faith that trusts in God’s will for what He has created. This faith does not require humans to abandon their freedom and power. On the contrary, it is only through the life of faith that humanity and God’s creation can truly flourish at all. The story of Babel presents human beings in the grip of idolatry. This idolatry is not made possible by their shared language. It is reflected in their language itself along with the common project that accompanies it. By confusing their language and scattering them across the earth, God frees the people of Babel from the grip of evil and opens the door to future redemption.

By recognizing that the common language at Babel is an essential manifestation of idolatry, rather than an enabling condition of it, we can see that the story is not merely intended as an explanation of linguistic diversity. Because the shared language is itself a reflection of an idolatrous form of life, the confusion of language plays an essential role in God’s solution to human evil. Presenting the nature of human wickedness and its solution is the primary goal of the story, not describing a mythic origin for human languages. The latter element is simply a result of the form that God’s solution takes. Acknowledging this key point of emphasis is crucial for understanding the role of Babel within the overarching narrative of Genesis as a whole.