Section 293 Of Philosophical Investigations

In section 293 of Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein considers the idea that human subjects only know the meaning of the word “pain” on the basis of their own experiences of pain. The passage runs as follows:

293. If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means—must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly? Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case!——Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.—Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing.—But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language?—If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty.—No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.

It may be tempting to interpret the upshot of Wittgenstein’s remarks here in the following way: In order to successfully use a name to refer to some object, that object must be related to the way our linguistic community uses the relevant name. However, in the imagined scenario, since the specific object in each speaker's box is not relevant to their use of the term ‘beetle”, they are not using the word “beetle” as a name for the private objects in their boxes. Likewise, private sensations are not related to the way our linguistic community uses the word “pain” so it does not name private objects that each of us experiences. 

This interpretation might appear to highlight an important continuity between the early Wittgenstein and his later work. In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein seems to present conditions for meaningful speech about reality. He then seems to show that these conditions cannot be satisfied by speech about language, ethics, and the self, among other philosophical subjects. This interpretation places the reader in a paradoxical situation: In order to recognize that one cannot meaningfully speak about language, ethics, and the self, one must first know that the nature of language does not allow for such speech. But this would seem to imply that Wittgenstein’s speech about language is meaningful after all. The solution, according to some interpreters of Wittgenstein, involves recognizing that, although Wittgenstein’s propositions in the Tractatus are, strictly speaking, nonsensical, they nevertheless make us aware of important ineffable truths about the nature of language. 

If one accepts this interpretation of the early Wittgenstein, section 293 of Philosophical Investigations can be understood as a new application of the old philosophical method. Wittgenstein presents certain conditions that must be met by meaningful speech and shows that speech about private objects does not meet those conditions. However, on this view, the fact that the conditions for meaningfulness cannot be satisfied by our speech about private objects does not imply that there are no private objects in experience. Like the truths of the Tractatus that render us silent regarding that which cannot be spoken about, these truths about experience may simply be ineffable. 

In my view, this general approach is mistaken as an interpretation of the early, as well as the later, Wittgenstein. What Wittgenstein seeks to show us, in Philosophical Investigations, is not that conditions on meaningful speech prevent us from speaking about private objects that may or may not be present. Rather, his remarksp are intended to highlight the fact that we do not use the term “pain” as the name for an object at all. At no point in his remarks does the later Wittgenstein concern himself with how we must speak or what we must speak about in order to speak meaningfully. Rather, in all cases, he simply aims to describe how we do, in fact, use our words. 

Returning to the imagined community of section 293, what this scenario presents is a situation in which a group of speakers do not use the term “beetle” as a name for the object in their box. What it does not present is a situation in which a group of speakers are confronted with private objects that cannot be named. Suppose that each speaker’s box did, in fact, contain a beetle. We can easily imagine a scenario in which a group of speakers opened each other’s box, examined the sort of thing that was inside each of them, and collectively decided to use the word “beetle” as a name for things of that sort. The fact that they do not do this in Wittgenstein’s scenario only shows that the use of the term “beetle” in his example is not what we would call the use of a name. Furthermore, in recognizing that their term “beetle” does not name objects inside of their boxes, we are not thereby committed to claiming that the objects in their boxes cannot be named. 

In a similar fashion, what Wittgenstein’s example shows is that our use of the term “pain” is not the use of a name for an object. What we call a “use of a name” is a use of a word that is responsive to the sort of thing we are naming and how things stand with respect to it. But, as Wittgenstein shows in 293 and the surrounding sections of Philosophical Investigations, this is not how we use the term “pain”. By reflecting on our use of the term “pain”, Wittgenstein aims to show us that it is not the use of name and that, on the basis of similar considerations, it is unclear what the claim “...it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means.” is actually supposed to mean. 

It is crucial to emphasize that Wittgenstein’s remarks in section 293 do not represent a move towards any form of behaviorism or eliminativism about mentality. As he goes on to note in section 304, he believes that there could hardly be a “greater difference” between pain and pain-behavior. Furthermore, he claims that “[Pain] is not a something, but not a nothing either!”. To claim that mentality is nothing other than behavior would be to hold that pain is, in fact, something that exists. But Wittgenstein’s latter remark is intended to highlight the fact that claiming some X does or does not exist only happens within a certain sort of language game. Specifically, it only happens in a language game that involves using a name for the relevant object. By denying that pain is a something or a nothing, Wittgenstein is simply pointing out that such affirmations have no role that is connected to our actual use of the word “pain”. For Wittgenstein, behaviourist and eliminativist theses depend upon the same misunderstandings that so-called “realism” exhibits. 

In conclusion, I would like to make some brief remarks on Wittgenstein’s diagnosis of the error that is highlighted by section 293 and discuss its relation to his early work. In section 125 of Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein describes the “fundamental fact” that gives rise to a need for philosophical reflection. This fact, he claims, is that “... we lay down rules, a technique, for a game, and that then when we follow the rules, things do not turn out as we had assumed.” He goes on to say that “...we can avoid ineptness or emptiness in our assertions only by presenting the model [of a language game] as what it is, as an object of comparison—as, so to speak, a measuring-rod; not as a preconceived idea to which reality must correspond.” (S.131). This temptation to understand our use of language in terms of a preconceived model is what Wittgenstein calls “dogmatism” in philosophy.

The error that Wittgenstein highlights in section 293 is one form of philosophical dogmatism. Specifically, it is a commitment to the preconceived notion that our use of the term “pain” can be understood “on the model of 'object and designation'”. (S.293) Wittgenstein believes that this error can be overcome once “we make a radical break with the idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts—which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or anything else you please.” (S.304) In other words, once we recognize that the word “pain” is not necessarily used to try and designate a certain object, we can overcome our tendency to think that pain must be a something or a nothing. 

The recognition that causes that philosophical puzzle to disappear also dissolves the apparent paradox at the heart of the Tractatus. The interpretation of the Tractatus considered earlier claims that Wittgenstein presents a theory of meaning and language that implies that his own propositions are nonsensical. This seems to suggest that, if his book succeeds, he must be using nonsensical propositions to make the reader aware of ineffable truths. However, if we follow the later Wittgenstein’s rejection of dogmatism, we can recognize that language is not always used to describe facts about reality. Rather, as Wittgenstein notes in section 295, philosophy provides “A full-blown pictorial representation of our grammar. Not facts; but as it were illustrated turns of speech.” To understand this passage is to understand that philosophical propositions can serve a purpose that does not involve conveying truths of any sort. They do not need to involve any attempt to speak where we must remain silent. In my view, this was already understood by the early Wittgenstein when he insisted that his nonsensical propositions were nevertheless “elucidatory.” Insofar as he later came to view his own efforts in the Tractatus dogmatic, the relevant form of dogmatism must be located elsewhere.