[This post is a sequel to my previous post, “On The Immateriality Of Mind”]
What is a priori knowledge and how can we possibly attain it? In order to answer these questions, we must first reflect on knowledge and its conditions more generally. At a minimum, if I (or any rational subject) knows something, we believe what we know truly on an appropriate basis. However, is this all that is required? Many philosophers have objected to this proposal as an account of the sufficient conditions for knowledge on the grounds that there are clear cases where true beliefs formed on an appropriate basis still fail to qualify as genuine knowledge (these are the famous “gettier cases” and their variants). I would like to set these cases aside for the moment. Regardless of how they are ultimately addressed, there is a further puzzle facing any account of the possibility of genuine knowledge. Namely, even if we did have a sufficient basis for knowledge available to us, would this alone be sufficient for us to be in a position to form true beliefs on that basis?
It seems to me that a sufficient basis of this sort would not be enough for us to understand how it is possible for us to form true beliefs. In order for me to form a belief on some basis, I cannot simply be aware of that basis. Rather, I must also recognize that my belief is formed upon a basis that is sufficient for genuine knowledge. If I lack this awareness then, for all that I am reflectively aware of, my basis may, in fact, be insufficient. In other words, in forming my belief upon that basis, I would still not be able to satisfy myself that my belief is, in fact, true. For all that I am reflectively aware of in forming my belief that P, it is nevertheless open to me that, possibly, P is not the case. But if I am in a position where I can entertain the possibility that P is not the case, given all that I am reflectively aware of, then I do not genuinely believe it at all. To believe that P is to hold that P is what is actually the case, and to arrive at such a belief with the aim of thinking what is true, I must recognize some basis which I take to be capable of settling the question, “P or not-P?”
Insofar as I take the reasons that explain my belief to be what settles the question, “P or not-P?” I must think that the truth of my belief is ensured by the reasons that lead me to form my belief. In other words, if I form my belief upon some basis, I cannot then proceed to investigate whether or not my basis for forming that belief is sufficient for ensuring its truth. If I believe that P, I must, in forming that belief, already be satisfied that my basis for believing is sufficient. This raises a question: How can we have knowledge that the causes of our beliefs is sufficient for knowledge unless we already possess some sort of knowledge about thinking and its proper explanation in the first place? On the one hand, if we say that we do not possess such knowledge, then it seems that we must admit the possibility of beliefs that are formed in the absence of an awareness that those beliefs have a sufficient basis for knowledge. On the other hand, if we maintain that we do possess such knowledge, then, on pain of circularity, it would seem that this knowledge cannot depend on our awareness of any sufficient basis at all. Solving this puzzle is what requires us to account for the possibility of a priori knowledge. It requires us to account for the possibility of satisfying ourselves of the truth of our beliefs without being aware of any sufficient basis for forming them.
If I believe that Socrates is a mortal because of the facts that all men are mortal and that Socrates is a man, then I recognize my reasons for belief as a sufficient basis for my belief that Socrates is a mortal. This requires me to know that my beliefs, when they are explained by certain reasons, are explained by reasons that ensure the truth of my beliefs. If I did not already know this, then it would remain open for me to doubt whether my reasons for believing that Socrates is a mortal were, in fact, good reasons for believing that. In this case, all that was reflectively available to me would not enable me to settle the questions “Is it the case that Socrates is a mortal?” But I am able to settle that question when I form that belief for those reasons because I do know that my beliefs are explained by reasons that ensure the truth of what I believe. In other words, I know that judgment is a certain sort of power that, when exercised, produces knowledge. I know that judgment is a power of knowledge.
However, as noted previously, we must still account for my knowledge of this very power. How can I know that judgment is a power of knowledge if this knowledge is already presupposed whenever I form beliefs on the basis of reasons? If it is required in order for me to form beliefs on the basis of reasons in the first place, then this knowledge cannot itself depend upon any reasons for belief. Rather, it must be a priori. How then, can I take what I believe, in knowing that judgment is a power of knowledge, to be true?
When we believe on the basis of good reasons, we take the basis of our beliefs to ensure the truth of those beliefs. If we believe something without any such basis, in order to be satisfied that our beliefs are true, we must be in a position to recognize their truth in the absence of any basis. In other words, we must be satisfied that their truth is ensured in the absence of any basis apart from our believing them. When we believe that judgment is a power of knowledge, this belief cannot depend on anything other than the activity of thinking itself. If it did, then it would remain open that, despite believing that judgment is a power of knowledge, my belief might nevertheless be false. In order for this knowledge to be a priori, I must know that the truth of my belief does not depend on anything other than my activity of thinking alone. I must know that thinking itself ensures the reality of the power that it is and, consequently, can know itself to be such a power in the absence of any independent basis for forming such a belief.
This is how it must be with a priori knowledge in general. In order to know something, independently of any basis, I must know that the activity of thinking itself ensures the reality of what it knows, a priori. Insofar as a knowledge of the nature of thought, as a power of judgment, must be a priori, we must know that the reality of that nature is ensured by the activity of thinking itself. In this sense, we can say along with Jean-Paul Sartre that, with respect to thinking, essence does not precede existence. However, we must oppose Sartre when he says that existence precedes essence. The nature of thought and its activity do not stand in any relation of priority with respect to one another. Rather, the essence of thinking is one and the same as its activity.
The reality of our a priori knowledge of the nature of thought establishes that thinking alone ensures the truth of what it thinks about its own nature. However, our a priori knowledge is not limited (and cannot be limited) to the nature of thought as such. Our a priori knowledge also includes the principles that govern reality in its entirety. In other words, we possess a priori knowledge of the laws of logic. Insofar as we know, a priori, that any fact opposes the negation of that fact (the law of non-contradiction) and that, for any possible fact, it either obtains or does not obtain (the law of excluded middle), the laws of logic are known independently of any mind-independent basis. Following the remarks made above, this entails that the reality of these laws must be known to be ensured by the activity of thinking alone. In other words, the nature of Being, along with the nature of Thought, must be known to be ensured by the activity of thinking alone. Indeed, just like the nature of thought, the nature of Being must be one and the same as the activity of thinking.
The conclusion specified in the final remarks of the preceding paragraph can be formulated in another way: Thinking and Being are the same. This is the formula of Absolute Idealism. This sameness is known, a priori, in any judgment, insofar as a thinker is satisfied that their judgment is true. Insofar as we make judgments on the basis of reasons, these judgments depend on a priori knowledge that does not, and is known not to, require any such basis. The truth of this knowledge must be known to be ensured independently of anything apart from the activity of thinking itself. Insofar as our a priori knowledge is a knowledge of the nature of Thought (the principles of thinking) and the nature of Being (the principles of logic), we must know that the reality of these natures is nothing apart from the reality of the very same activity.
The ancient philosopher, Parmenides, famously wrote that “It is the same thing that can be and that can be thought”. Aristotle followed his insight by treating the metaphysical principle of non-contradiction as one and the same as the psychological principle of non-contradiction (Metaphysics, 4.3). These philosophers are articulating their knowledge that the activity of thinking is the same as the activity of Being. In order for contemporary philosophy to successfully address the myriad of puzzles that it has consistently failed to overcome, this knowledge must ultimately be recovered.
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