When we reflect on what it means to believe something for a reason, we can arrive at a basic conception of what this phenomenon involves. In a minimal sense, believing that P for some reason R can be understood in terms of a rational transition from one conceptual state to another. A rational transition is essentially one that a subject can self-consciously represent in terms of the reasons that explain their belief. When one conceptual state rationally guides the formation of another, a subject reflects on the reasons provided by the former state and the judgements that they support. The content of the former state then provides the reasons that the subject takes to explain the formation of the latter state. In this basic sense, reasons for belief are non-factive. Even if a conceptual state does not accurately or truly represent reality, its content can still provide a reason for beliefs.
Justified beliefs are beliefs formed for good reasons that are provided by the contents of justifying conceptual states. Even if one believes that Socrates is mortal because all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, unless one justifiably believes that all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, the resulting judgment will not be justified. Furthermore, if one forms a belief for bad reasons, that belief will not be justified even if one justifiably believes those reasons
Good reasons for belief are reasons that, if they are factive, ensure the truth of the resulting judgment. Justifying conceptual states are states that are or enable knowledge when things go well. When one believes P for good reasons that one knows to be true, one’s belief is explained by the facts that one knows. These facts ensure that the resulting belief is also knowledge.
In light of this basic picture of reasons for belief, we can provide a straightforward account of the dilemma posed by the myth of the given and coherentism. According to the myth of the given, some non-conceptual states (perceptual experiences being a paradigm case) have a rational bearing upon our judgements. The issue with this proposal is that being in a non-conceptual state does not put one in a position to reflect on reasons provided by that state and the judgements that they support. While a non-conceptual state may cause a subject to form beliefs that accurately reflect its content, they cannot enable the sort of rational transition that is required for genuine reasoning. This is why the given is a myth: There cannot be states that are simultaneously non-conceptual and rationally significant.
If one rejects the myth of the given, it is tempting to deny the rational significance of experience altogether and accept the coherentist claim that only beliefs can provide reasons for our beliefs. After all, beliefs are conceptual states of the sort that can feature in genuine reasoning. However, coherentism has no advantage over the myth of the given when it comes to explaining the rational connection between reality and our judgments about it. If our reasons for belief can only be supplied by other beliefs, we must either posit an infinite regress of reasons for belief or accept that our beliefs terminate in judgements that are made for no reason at all. In either case, there is no room for the thought that our beliefs are rationally responsive to the world. But this implication is unacceptable. We do take ourselves to be rationally responsive to objective reality. Any view that fails to accommodate that fact has failed to accommodate our existence as reasoning subjects.
How can we avoid the threats posed by the myth of the given and coherentism? In order to account for how the world rationally bears upon our judgements, we must reject the widespread assumption that perceptual experience is a non-conceptual phenomenon. While it is true that conceptual states are the only states involved in genuine reasoning, this does not entail that beliefs are our only source of reasons. Rather, perceptual experiences can also supply us with reasons for judgment precisely because they are also conceptual states. Perceptual states, by virtue of having conceptual content, put us in a position to reflect on the worldly affairs that they represent and to form judgements on that basis. This makes it possible for our beliefs to terminate in basic judgements that are nevertheless formed for good reasons. In this way, viewing perceptual experiences as conceptual states allows us to avoid the myth of the given as well as coherentism.
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