Brief Outline Of An Account Of Knowledge, Justification, And Reasons

 

In a minimal sense, believing that P for some reason R can be understood in terms of a rational transition from one conceptual state to another. A rational transition is one that a subject can self-consciously represent in terms of their reasons for believing that P. When one conceptual state rationally guides the formation of another, the content of the former state provides the reason for the formation of the latter. In this minimal sense, reasons for belief are non-factive. Even if conceptual state does not accurately or truly represent reality, its content can still serve as a reason for beliefs. 

Justified beliefs are beliefs formed for good reasons that are provided by the contents of justifying conceptual states. Even if one believes that Socrates is mortal because all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, unless one justifiably believes that all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, the resulting judgment will not be justified. Furthermore, if one forms a belief for bad reasons, it will not be justified even if one justifiably believes those reasons. 

Good reasons for belief are reasons that, if they are factive, ensure the truth of the resulting judgment. Justifying conceptual states are states that are or yield knowledge when things go well. When one believes P for good reasons that one knows to be true, one’s belief is explained by the facts that one knows. These facts ensure that the resulting belief is also knowledge. 

In summary: 

Reasons for belief can be understood in terms of rational transitions between conceptual states. One’s reasons are provided by the contents of the conceptual states that lead to one’s judgment.

Justification is the result of appropriate transitions between conceptual states. These transitions are appropriate because, in good conditions, they yield knowledge. 

Rational judgment is a capacity to know what is the case on the basis of facts that establish the truth of one’s beliefs. 

-The Account Applied To Perceptual Knowledge

In order to form justified perceptual beliefs, one’s perceptual judgments must be the result of rational transitions from justifying conceptual states. Since our perceptual judgments are guided by our perceptual experiences, perceptual experiences must therefore be conceptual states. 

If a perceptual experience represents some fact P, that experience, in the absence of defeaters, enables one to justifiably believe what it represents. In normal cases, if the experience is veridical, it enables one to know that P on the basis of the fact that P. Because the evidence provided by veridical perception, in normal cases, guarantees the truth of one’s perceptual judgments, these judgments are incompatible with the possibility of error.